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Syria and Iraq: The Long-Term Cost of 
Geopolitical Destabilisation
Jörg Michael Dostal
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Writing in 2007 and addressing the question of why the United States (US) leader­
ship headed by George W. Bush decided to occupy Iraq in 2003, the widely published 
Canadian journalist Gwynne Dyer argued that the end of the Cold War and economic 
globalization had fundamentally altered the calculus of great power politics in the 
Middle East: “The Cold War ended almost twenty years ago, and since then it really 
hasn’t mattered from a strategic point of view whether Country A is ‘pro-American’ 
or ‘pro-Russian.’ There isn’t going to be a military confrontation between the United 
States and Russia, and Country A will gladly sell its oil to the highest bidder regardless 
of ideology or alliances. By the same token, the U.S.-Israeli alliance no longer serves 
Washington’s strategic purposes, especially since it comes with such a high diplomatic 
cost.”1
Looking back at Dyer’s assertions in 2015, one cannot help but think that his an­
nouncement of the end of traditional geopolitics was premature. With the exception 
of the first half sentence about the end of the Cold War, practically every other claim 
appears highly doubtful as judged from our current point of knowledge and interpreta­
tion. While it is true that there is no “war” between the US and Russia -  such a war 
would mean the end of humanity due to mutually assured nuclear destruction -  one 
must nevertheless observe that the self-dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 has not 
meant the end of geopolitical contestation between the US and Russia in the Middle 
East and elsewhere.
When reading Dyer, one should acknowledge that there is still no agreement about 
the factors that could “ultimately” explain the reasoning of US policy-makers behind 
the invasion of Iraq -  nor is there ever going to be full agreement given that major 
sources of evidence will remain out of the public domain. On the other hand, much 
information has become public since 2003 and one can state beyond reasonable doubt 
that the official US and United Kingdom (UK) government claims, namely unfounded 
allegations about ongoing Iraqi programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction
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1 Dyer, Gwynne, TheMess TheyMade: TheMiddleEast Afterlraq, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 2007, p. 41.
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(WMD), did not motivate the attack. Moreover, the events of September 11, 2001 were 
in no way linked with Saddam Hussein.2
A sufficiently high number of Washington insiders have since gone on record to 
state with confidence that plans to occupy Iraq existed long before September 11, 2001. 
While the so-called “neocons” of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) are 
usually acknowledged to have invented the doctrine of “regime change” in the Middle 
East and elsewhere in order to defend US global hegemony, one must immediately add 
that support for such plans did extend far beyond this group to include American na­
tionalists in the mainstream of the Bush Jr. administration and the earlier Bill Clinton 
and George H. W. Bush (Bush Sr.) administrations.
Retired US general Wesley Clark, former CIA chief George Tenet and former 
Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, who was also in the National Security Council 
between 2001 and 2002, among others, are all on record as having made statements 
pointing to the Bush Jr. administration’s planning of the removal of Saddam Hussein 
prior to September 11, 2001.3 Wesley Clark, who had earlier failed to become the presi­
dential nominee of the Democrats in 2004 and was considering a second run in 2008, 
suggested in a speech delivered in 2007 that the US was engaged in regime change 
efforts on a large scale. He quoted a Pentagon official who, according to Clark, told him 
in person days after September 11, 2001 that “we’re going to take out seven countries 
in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, 
finishing off, Iran.”4 Although the timeline of five years has not been borne out by 
subsequent events, the list of countries has proved to be remarkably accurate.
Stressing the element of continuity in US power politics in the Middle East does 
not, in fact, require recourse to the accuracy of the personal memory of retired gener­
als, administrators or policy-makers. Rather, it has been the official policy of the US 
administrations since the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 to consider any entrance of 
rival powers into the Middle East as a legitimate reason for the use of military force
2 Cramer, Jane K. and Thrall, A. Trevor, WhyDid the Idnded States Invade Iraq?, Abingdon, Oxon., Routledge, 
2012, ch. 1. The authors report that many US citizens still believe that Saddam Hussein was linked with September 
11, 2001.
3 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9RClMepk_Sw for the quote. See also Clark’s speech atthe 
Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, CA, on October 3, 2007, https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=TY2DKzastu8; for Tenet, see WashingtonPost, April 28, 2007; for O’Neill, see CNN.com, January 14, 
2004. Numerous other sources could be added.
4 Clark claims to quote the words of an anonymous Pentagon official who in turn is held to have quoted from 
a memo (see footnote 3). Some authors discussing Clark have in turn suggested that the quoted statement 
originated with Donald Rumsfeld, although the transcript of Clark’s talk is hazy on this point. When pressed by the 
interviewer, Clark refused to state the name of the quoted official. See http://www.democracynow.Org/2007/3/2/ 
gen_wesley_clark_weighs_presidential_bid.
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to fend off such competition.5 The Eisenhower Doctrine continues to apply today. Its 
main theme of US willingness to use military power to achieve its geopolitical goal 
of regional dominance in the Middle East has been reinstated by virtually every US 
administration since then.
Most prominently, US President Jimmy Carter, then under the influence of his 
National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, declared in his State of the Union 
Address of January 23, 1980 that “[a]n attempt by any outside force to gain control 
of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the 
United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force.”6 In a similar vein, President Barack Obama stated in his UN 
Security Council speech on Syria of September 24, 2013 that the US “is prepared to 
use all elements of our power, including military force, to secure our core interests 
in the region.”7 Briefly put, US regional power politics has relied since the US rise to 
dominance in the Middle East on privileged alliances with local client states -  Israel 
and Saudi Arabia as well as Iran under the Shah until 1979 and, to a lesser extent, on 
Egypt since the country’s shift back toward US patronage in the late 1970s.
It is in the context of continuity of US behaviour in the region, enshrined in the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, and escalated further after the end of the Cold War with the on­
going expansion of the network of US military bases in Arab states, that this article 
will briefly discuss the cases of Syria and Iraq. To be sure, this analytical focus on US 
power is not the only valid approach. In addition, geopolitical inquiry in the age of the 
Internet suffers neither from a scarcity of sources nor from secrecy as such. Instead, 
there exists an abundance of plausible sources that allow for more than one equally 
plausible interpretation of the evidence.
The remainder of this article briefly sketches some geopolitical features of the 
Middle East (section 1) before providing a brief overview about Syrian and Iraqi geopo­
litical history until the most recent cycles of conflict (sections 2 and 3). Sections 4 and 5 
discuss the most recent crisis cycle in Iraq since 2003 and in Syria since 2011. Thus, the 
article’s purpose is to highlight why Syria and Iraq became targets of US power politics 
and how this destabilization has escalated pre-existing ethnic and sectarian tensions in 
the region, which could undermine the continuing existence ofboth states.
5 See http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php7pidM 1007&st=&stl for the full text of Eisenhower’s 
“Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East” [i.e., “the Doctrine”], delivered on January 
5, 1957. Stressing his primarily geopolitical rather than ideological concerns, Eisenhower claimed that “Russia’s 
rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. That was true of the Czars and is true of the Bolsheviks” 
(ibid.).
6 See http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/7pidM3079.
7 See http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/US_en_0.pdf, p. 5.
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Modern Syria and Iraq are essentially the product of the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot 
Agreement between Britain and France about the division of the Middle East into a 
“Zone A” (the area designated as the French zone of influence comprising what became 
Lebanon and Syria) and a “Zone B” (the area designated as the British zone of influ­
ence comprising what subsequently became Palestine, Jordan and Iraq). This drafting 
of colonial border lines -  subsequently approved at the request of both powers under 
the “Mandate” of the League of Nations -  portended long-term structural problems 
for Syria and Iraq in the post-colonial period. In the Syrian case, the French handed 
over the north-western border region of the Mandate (the Sanjak of Alexandretta) to 
Turkey. In addition, Lebanon was parcelled off from Syria.8 As for Iraq, the country 
was constructed with borders with six other states but with very limited access to the 
Persian Gulf. Its ethnic and sectarian composition was likely to trigger conflict with its 
neighbours.9
The history of post-colonial statehood in Syria and Iraq began in 1946 and 1958, 
respectively. In the Syrian case, the country became independent at least partially due 
to an informal coalition between the US and the UK, pushing for French withdrawal 
from the Middle East at the end of World War 2, which helped local Arab nationalists to 
achieve independence. In the case of Iraq, the revolution of 1958 destroyed the British­
controlled monarchy and the country gained independence under the leadership of the 
local military. Both countries were made up of different sects (most prominently Sunni 
and Shia Muslims and Christians of different denominations) and included significant 
non-Arab ethnic minorities ofKurds and othergroups.
It is, however, impossible to discuss the history of Syria and Iraq -  territorial na­
tions rather than nation states -  without looking at the larger regional picture of power 
relationships in the Arab world, especially the emergence of modern pan-Arab na­
tionalism in Egypt around the same time. Here, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Free Officer 
Movement removed the British-backed monarchy in 1952. Subsequently, Nasser skil­
fully played different outside powers against each other, gaining substantial political 
autonomy in the process, and Egypt quickly acquired a leadership role in the Arab 
world. Following his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956, a tripartite military 
attack from France, the UK and Israel tried to remove him from power.
8 Seale, Patrick, The Strugglefor Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and iheRa.kers oIiheHodernHiddle East,
В
 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 579-583.
9 Musallam, Musallam Ali, The Iraqi invasion ofKuwait: Saddam Hussein, his State and International Power 
Politics, London, British Academic Press, 1996,pp.63,68,80.
Eisenhower sensed that the Suez invasion was a doomed effort of the declining 
European colonial powers to retain their position in the Middle East and refused to back 
it financially. Only eight weeks after the failed invasion, the Eisenhower Doctrine was 
issued and this date underlined imperial succession in the Middle East -  the transition 
from UK to US regional dominance. Meanwhile, Nasser first asked the US for eco­
nomic and military assistance and, meeting intransigence, turned to the Soviet Union, 
which quickly granted substantial support. These events ushered in a new regional 
system, namely the division of the Middle East into an US-backed camp (Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iran under the Shah between 1953 and 1979) and a Soviet-backed camp 
(Egypt between 1956 and 1978, Syria between 1956 and 1961, and since 1963, and Iraq 
between 1958 and the 1980s).10 Other Arab states, such as Jordan and Lebanon, were 
too weak to play much of an independent role in this regional conflict.
2 . T h e  G e o p o l i t i c s  o f  M o d e r n  S y r i a
Syria’s leadership after independence in 1946 initially consisted of the traditional 
landed gentry of Sunni Muslim origin that did form a notionally democratic presiden­
tial republic. However, this group lacked the necessary resources to engage in modern 
mass politics and the country was short of regional or other external patronage to back 
up its independent position in the early Cold War period. Moreover, Arab nationalist 
discourse after WW2 focused on abstract calls for unity of the “Arab nation” when 
faced with the Zionist settlement project in Palestine. In reality, the Arab states were 
mostly engaged in infighting about regional leadership and threatened each other with 
hostile takeover.11
In the Syrian context, the short experiment with a deeply flawed democracy came 
to an end in 1949 when three military coups in a single year resulted in the rise of a 
series of strongmen who aspired to lead Syria, but each lasting only until the next coup. 
At least two of the three coups included some involvement of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), acting in the service of US oil companies keen to enforce the assent of 
Syria’s leadership to oil pipeline projects intended to link US-controlled Saudi oil fields 
with the Mediterranean and West European markets.12
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10 Stephens, Robert, Nasser. A PoliticalBiography, London, Penguin, 1971, ch. 8.
11 Seale, Patrick, The Strugglefor Syria.A Study ofPost-WarArab Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1965.
12 Dostal, Jörg Michael, “Post-Independence Syria and the Great Powers (1946-1958): How Western Power 
Politics Pushed the Country Toward the Soviet Union.” Annual Meeting of the Academic Council of the United 
Nations System, June 19-21,2014, Istanbul, http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Syria-Paper-1946-1958- 
for-ACUNS-Conference-Website-12-June-2014.pdf.
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The most sophisticated of the three Syrian military leaders of this period, Adib 
Shishakli, who remained in power from 1949 to 1954, appealed to the US leadership for 
backing and offered privileged access to Syria on the condition that the US would take 
a more balanced position in the conflict between Arab nationalism and Zionism -  an 
offer subsequently vetoed by Israel and rejected by Eisenhower. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, Syrian politics became defined by the rise of modern ideological politics 
-  mostly represented by Baathists, Communists and Syrian nationalists -  and by the 
increasing role of the army as the only working national institution that soon turned 
into the actual source of political power.
Ultimately, officers linked with the Baath Party gained power in a 1963 coup at 
the expense of the other forces. The Baathist ideology of pan-Arab and largely secular 
Arab nationalism -  although the party’s slogan “One indivisible Arab nation with an 
eternal mission” also refers to Islam -  was originally developed by the Greek Orthodox 
Christian Michel Aflaq and the Sunni Muslim Salah al-Din al-Bitar. In 1966, the so- 
called “neo-Baath,” which combined pan-Arab nationalism with leftist ideas, side-lined 
the founding generation of Baathism in Syria. This new collective leadership of mili­
tary men was in turn replaced by Hafiz al-Assad (Syria’s president between 1971 and 
2000) during the so-called “Correction Movement” of 1970 that reintroduced a more 
centrist political line of the Baath and made efforts to expand the coalition running 
Syria to include more Sunnis, including sections of the traditional Sunni bourgeoisie.
Most crucially, different interpretations of Baathist ideology served to hide the 
actual conflict lines of Syrian politics derived from sect, family, region and social 
class. Over time, the Alawites, a religious minority to which the Assad family belongs 
and that is mostly settled around the Mediterranean city of Latakia, had gained the 
ascendancy in the command structure of the Syrian army. Since the army was the most 
stable institution, the Alawites -  initially recruited by the French authorities into the 
local armed forces during the period of the Mandate -  acquired influence in all other 
branches of the Syrian state too. However, one must stress that this authority was al­
ways managed in alliances with the other groups of Syrian society and Syrian politics 
cannot be reduced to issues of sectarianism.
Two major developments added to the increasing dominance of the military and 
the national security state in Syria. The first factor was the country’s defeat in the 1967 
war with Israel that resulted in the occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights by Israel. 
This occupation of Syrian territory is illegal according to numerous United Nations 
(UN) resolutions. Since 1967, Syria’s leadership has made military efforts (recovery of 
some territory in the 1973 war) and engaged in diplomacy (failed negotiations of Syria’s
President Hafiz al-Assad with Israel during much of the 1990s) to recover the Golan, 
and the issue remains at the core of the conflict between Israel and Syria.13
The second major conflict within Syria was the uprising of the Syrian branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood against the Baath regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which 
amounted to a lengthy terrorist campaign against representatives of the Syrian state in 
general and Alawites in particular. Crucially, the Brotherhood, whose support in Syria 
was always very limited, received extensive sponsorship from neighbouring countries. 
In particular, Saddam Hussein was keen to bring down the Syrian leadership.14 This 
episode highlighted the fact that the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes, although both no­
tionally committed to pan-Arab nationalism and backed up by Soviet patronage, were 
for almost the entirety of their coexistence deeply hostile to each other. The conflict 
remained one of the most significant long-term features of Arab politics during the 
1970s and 1980s.15
3. T h e  G e o p o l i t i c s  o f  M o d e r n  I r a q
In Iraq, the development of the modern state shared some features with neighbouring 
Syria. After the 1958 revolution, General Abd al-Karim Qasim became Prime Minister 
and promoted an Iraqi nationalism that reached out to the Kurdish minority and relied at 
times on an alliance with the Communists whose stronghold was concentrated among 
oil workers who were mostly Shia Muslims. The new regime soon faced domestic op­
position from Nasserist and Baathist forces. Uprisings and coups in 1959, 1963 and 
1968 ultimately allowed the Iraqi Baath party to gain power, first under the leadership 
of Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and then, officially since July 1979 but in reality earlier, 
under Saddam Hussein.
In order to further explain the regional role of Syria and Iraq, one must focus on 
two more levels of analysis. The first one is the military build-up of both states backed 
by Soviet assistance, which largely removed the two states from the direct reach of US 
regional power politics. The wars between Israel and some Arab states in 1967 and 
1973 resulted in Arab defeats. Israel received much larger military assistance from the 
US than Brezhnev’s Soviet Union was willing to grant its Arab allies. Nevertheless, 
the 1973 war appeared to show that Egypt, Syria and Iraq could possibly succeed in 
establishing strategic parity with Israel, since their military performance improved
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13 Ghani, Jasmine K., “Understanding and Explaining US-Syrian Relations: Conflict and Cooperation, and the 
Role ofldeology.” Ph.D., London School ofEconomics and Political Science, 2011, http://etheses.lse.ac.Uk/348/l/ 
Gani_Understanding%20and%20Explaining%20US-Syrian%20Relations.pdf, pp. 231-240.
14 See the declassified US Defense Intelligence Agency file “Syria: Muslim Brotherhood: Pressure Intensifies.” 
May 1982, https://syria360.files.wordpress.com/2013/ll/dia-syria-muslimbrotherhoodpressureintensifies-2.pdf. 
The document describes the Brotherhood as a “Sunni Muslim Islamist fundamentalist organization” (p. iii).
15 Kienle, Eberhard, B a ’ath versus B a’ath: "The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, London, I.B. Taurus, 1990.
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significantly after lessons of defeat in the 1967 war had been learned. The US reacted 
to this development in two ways. On the one hand, Israel received even more mili­
tary supplies and became the only country in the Middle East with a nuclear arsenal 
(the US had from the start acted as Israel’s main economic supporter and had replaced 
France as Israel’s major arms supplier in the 1960s). In addition, the US expanded its 
military supplies to the two other regional clients, Saudi Arabia and the Shah’s Iran, 
significantly.
The Nixon Doctrine, issued in 1969, appeared to break with the earlier Eisenhower 
Doctrine in the sense that US client states were asked to take greater responsibility for 
their defence rather then rely on direct US military intervention. However, in prac­
tice both Doctrines mutually reinforced each other: the Nixon Doctrine provided for 
the recycling of petro dollars -  oil dollars were turned into purchase of US military 
hardware -  and “what began as an effort to build up and empower surrogates, client 
states in the Gulf that would do the bidding of the United States, proved instead to 
be the gateway for more direct projection of American military power.”16 For most of 
the 1970s, both superpowers maintained a regional balance of forces, with the Soviet 
Union acting in a junior role and certainly not receiving much by way of return for 
its regional engagement.17 This situation changed, however, when the US managed to 
regain control of Egyptian domestic politics during the rule of President Anwar Sadat. 
Removing “the strongest country from the Arab line-up” after Sadat’s unilateral turn 
toward negotiations with Israel in 1978 guaranteed, according to a prominent observer, 
“Israeli dominance for 30 years.”18
The second important geopolitical level of analysis to explain US interest in the 
containment of Syria and Iraq during this period concerned economic affairs. Until the 
1970s, the Arab states outside of the US sphere of influence essentially relied on Soviet 
military assistance for defence purposes and to contain domestic conflict. Yet their 
weak economic base did not allow for socioeconomic modernization. In the case of 
Iraq, the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) had remained in the hands of a foreign con­
sortium controlled by the UK, the US and France. In the early 1970s, this framework 
of economic control finally broke down. First, new oil discoveries in Syria -  modest 
by Iraqi standards -  allowed the country to join the group of oil states. Meanwhile, 
the Iraqi government signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union on April 9, 
1972 and then nationalized the IPC on July 1, 1972 without compensating western oil 
interests. This decision triggered in turn a move by the US to end diplomatic relations.
16 Jones, Toby Craig, “America, Oil, and War in the Middle East,” JowraaZ ofAmericanHistory, 99, 1, 2012, p. 
210.
17 The Arab nationalist regimes regularly repressed domestic Communist Parties (especially in Egypt and in Iraq) 
while Soviet economic assistance for the Arabs did not deliver direct rewards for the oil-rich Soviet Union.
18 Seale, Patrick, “The Syrian Crisis and the New Cold War,” agenceglobal.com, February 7, 2012.
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In fact, the nationalization of Iraqi oil wealth combined with rising oil prices after 
the 1973 war between Israel and the Arabs resulted in the most rapid expansion of 
government revenue in the country’s history. Between 1972 and 1980, Iraqi oil revenue 
increased more than 30 times according to Iraqi government figures.19 As a result, the 
Iraqi leadership started to enjoy considerable autonomy from outside influences and 
domestic pressures. The rising oil rents allowed Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Syria to 
become rentier states governed by powerful state classes.20 Both regimes were now in a 
position to engage in socio-economic reform and a military build-up at the same time.
The expansion of oil wealth in Syria and Iraq allowed the shift from developing 
to transition country status. From the 1970s onwards, urbanization advanced quickly, 
the education system expanded, the status of women was raised and state revenue was 
spread in far enough a manner to improve general living standards. In Syria, oil reve­
nue remained limited and much of the increase in government revenue was spent on the 
country’s military in the ultimately overambitious effort to achieve strategic parity with 
Israel.21 By contrast, Iraq’s much larger oil rents enabled Saddam Hussein to engage in 
efforts to acquire a leadership position in the Arab world following Sadat’s 1978 deci­
sion to sign a unilateral peace treaty with Israel (the Camp David Accord). Iraqi efforts 
to replace Egyptian leadership appeared at times rather successful, such as during a 
meeting in Baghdad in November 1978 in which all Arab states with the exception of 
Egypt participated to underline their joint rejection of Sadat’s position.22 In parallel, 
Iraq expanded its military based on French and Soviet supplies and modernized its 
economy by importing infrastructure from western countries other than the US.
Yet the rise of autonomous state classes in Syria and Iraq questioned from the 
US point of view the balance of power in the region. In particular, Saddam Hussein’s 
aspiration for regional Arab leadership was considered a significant threat and, follow­
ing the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry, the Nixon administration turned to the 
Shah of Iran and, between 1972 and 1976, sold more weapons to Iran than any other 
country in the region. The Shah became the US’s closest ally in its efforts to contain 
Iraq, and the US supported his request to finance Kurdish separatists in Northern Iraq
19 Such figures are quoted in Hussain, Abdul J. O., “The Oil Industry and Missed Opportunities in Iraq.” 
EuropeanJournal ofAccounting,Auditing andFinanceResearch, 2, August 2014, p. 8. All available datapoints 
to a large-scale expansion of revenue between 1972 and 1980, a major decline during the war years, and a near­
disappearance of the oil rent in the early 1990s due to the sanctions.
20 Forthe concept of the “state class” and its relative autonomy from western powers, see Elsenhans, Hartmut, 
AbhangigerKapiíalismus oder bürokratische Entwicklungsgesellschaft: Versuch über den Staat in derDnnen 
Welt, Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1984.
21 Seale, Patrick,A$tfd; "The Strugglefor theMiddleEast, Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1995.
22 Lustick, Ian S., “The Absence ofMiddle Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical 
Perspective.” International Organization, 51, 4, p. 672.
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to put pressure on the Iraqi leadership.23 This move proved successful enough to force 
Baghdad to make concessions to the Shah regarding the Shatt al-Arab border disputes 
(the contested area between Iraq and Iran that made up Iraq’s tight access point to the 
Persian Gulf). Saddam Hussein’s subsequent signing of an agreement with the Shah 
purchased the Iranian withdrawal of support for the Iraqi Kurds (the so-called Algiers 
agreement of June 13, 1975). Following this agreement, the Shah ended support for 
Iraqi Kurds and Iraq and Iran both started to repress Kurdish separatist movements.24
The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 led to the downfall of the Shah regime and 
appeared to dramatically weaken US power in the region. Saddam Hussein’s decision 
to attack Iran in 1980 was an effort to take advantage of the domestic disorganisa­
tion in Iran that had weakened the country’s military. The war goal was to improve 
Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf and to overturn the concessions that Iraq had made 
to the Shah’s Iran with regard to the Shatt al-Arab border issues in the 1976 Algiers 
Agreement. There is not enough space here for a detailed analysis of the eight-year war 
in which Iraq repeatedly used WMDs (chemical weapons) in the trench warfare against 
Iranian troops and in the domestic conflict with Iraqi Kurds. It is sufficient to stress 
that Iraq received between 1980 and 1988 massive supplies of arms from abroad while 
Iran’s external support was comparatively limited. When the initial Iraqi offensive nev­
ertheless came to a halt and the war started to turn against Iraq in 1983, the Reagan 
administration became concerned about an Iranian military victory. In this situation, 
President Reagan dispatched Donald Rumsfeld as a special envoy to Baghdad and, fol­
lowing talks with Saddam Hussein, the National Security Decision Directive 139 of the 
Reagan administration instructed in April 1984 to prepare “a plan of action designed to 
avert an Iraqi [military] collapse.”25
Although this effort at “rebalancing” on the part of the US did not result in massive 
direct delivery of US weapons to Iraq -  this role was mostly performed by France and 
the Soviet Union -  the US started to supply intelligence such as satellite pictures of 
Iranian military positions to the Iraqi military. The US and other western countries 
(West Germany, Spain and Italy) also delivered components to supply the Iraqi chemi­
cal weapons programme. While some of these deliveries were “dual use” (i.e., they 
could be used for civilian and military purposes), the concerned western states contin­
ued such deliveries even after it had become clear that the Iraqi army used chemical
23 Kiely, Patrick, “Through distorted lenses: Iraq and balance of power politics 1969-1979.” in Ryan, David and 
Kiely, Patrick (eds), America and Iraq. Policy-making, intervention and regionalpolitics, London, Routledge, 
2009, pp. 44, 46.
24 Kostiner, Joseph, Conflict and Cooperation in the GulfRegion, Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 
2009, pp. 39-41.
25 “Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War.” April 5, 
1984, p. 2, see http://fas.org/irp/ofldocs/nsdd/nsdd-139.pdf.
weapons for purposes of domestic reprisal against the Kurds and against the Iranian 
army on multiple occasions.26
While Iraq clearly received the overwhelming share of foreign arms supplies be­
tween 1980 and 1988, the “rebalancing” was flexible enough for occasional supplies to 
Iran too. The US and Israel delivered, for example, large quantities of anti-tank missiles 
to the Iranian military (some of it as part of the “Iran-Contra Deal”).27 Overall, the 
“rebalancing” served the purpose of keeping the war going and weakening both sides 
economically.
After the end of the inconclusive war with Iran, Saddam Hussein took the deci­
sion to occupy neighbouring Kuwait on August 2, 1990. This action was intended as a 
means to settle the Iraqi war debt with the richer Sunni Gulf states, which had financed 
Iraq’s war with Iran from their oil revenue while much of the Iraqi production had 
been stopped between 1980 and 1988. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait allowed the US 
administration of George H. W. Bush to assemble a coalition of western and regional 
powers (including Syria) that subsequently forced the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait in 1991 
in what is termed in western accounts as the “First Gulf War” -  although it was the 
Second Gulf War from the point of view of the Iraqis and Iranians. The western inter­
vention of 1990-1991 “liberated” Kuwait (the pro-western family regime was restored) 
but stopped short of removing Saddam Hussein from power. Crucially, the US used 
the conflict to ask Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to open their borders for what 
subsequently turned into permanent US military bases and installations.28
26 In this context, US authorities have only recently acknowledged (Chivers, C.J., “The Secret Casualties of 
Iraq’s Abandoned Chemical Weapons,” Vew 'fork "Times, October 14, 2014) that weapons of mass destruction 
were discovered afterthe occupation oflraq in 2003. Yet these arms caches were not evidence of an Iraqi WMD 
programme after 1990 but consisted of deteriorating chemical weapons from the time of the Iraq-Iran war. The 
disclosure was delayed because the US military leadership was unwilling to acknowledge that US soldiers were 
exposed to harmful substances in efforts to dispose of the weapons by exploding them via open-air detonation. 
According to the same author, these actions could amount to offences against the chemical weapons convention 
(New 'fork "Times, November 22, 2014). The US authorities have so far refused to disclose site locations where 
chemical weapons were blown up. One can therefore only speculate about how Iraqi civilians might have been 
affected.
27 See the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute website for authoritative data on arms exports during 
the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iranwar.
28 See Vine, David, http://www.motherjones.eom/politics/2014/l 1/america-still-has-hundreds-military-bases- 
worldwide-have-they-made-us-any-safer for a recent narrative about US military bases and deployment in the 
Middle East and elsewhere. Since the 1990s, the US has expanded their permanent military presence in Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Although officially moving away from combat 
operations, the US continues to maintain or has redeployed significant numbers of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The actual number of troops is subject to change but the facilities to allow quick deployment have stayed in place.
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The war was followed by a UN economic embargo of Iraq, once again targeting 
Iraqi oil exports, to stop the country from rearming its military. However, the actual 
outcome of the UN sanctions regime was the devastation of the Iraqi health and educa­
tion system, the rise of illiteracy and the destruction of the remnants of the Iraqi middle 
class.29 According to two UN humanitarian relief coordinators, who both resigned from 
their Baghdad posting in protest over the sanctions, the effort to block practically all 
trade “destroyed society in Iraq and caused the death of thousands, young and old.”30 
The sanctions were backed up by two US- and UK-policed no-flight zones in the north­
ern and southern Iraqi air space which officially served to protect Iraqi Kurds and Shias 
from strikes by the Iraqi air force. In these two zones, US and UK air forces conducted 
more than 200,000 sorties between 1991 and 2003 and regularly attacked Iraqi targets. 
This unacknowledged air war only became reported due to the ad hoc collection of 
data by the UN security section in Baghdad, which pointed to a pattern of at least two 
attacks per week in 1999.31
Before turning to the most recent events in Iraq since the occupation in 2003 and 
in Syria since 2011, one should therefore stress that the current conflicts are the con­
tinuation of earlier escalations. Indeed, Iraq has now suffered from war or war-like 
conditions for thirty-five years.
4 . T h e  C r i s i s  C y c l e  i n  I r a q  s i n c e  2 0 0 3
This section is not going to retell the story of the US and UK occupation of Iraq between 
2003 and 2012, which is still part of recent memory. The usual criticisms, such as the 
failure of the occupying forces to maintain law and order; the mistake of dissolving the 
old Iraqi state and military without putting any working new structures in place; the 
failure to protect civilians in general and religious and ethnic minorities in particular; 
and the large-scale destruction of the infrastructure and cultural heritage, have been ex­
tensively covered elsewhere.32 Instead, analysis is going to focus on three other crucial 
points in the context of Iraq’s geopolitical role. First, the politics of Iraqi oil since 2003
29 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, London: Hurst, 2006, p. 111.
30 Sponeck, Hans von and Haliday, Dennis, “The hostage nation,” Guardian, November 29, 2001. There are 
various estimates pointing to large-scale deaths oflraqis due to the sanction-induced breakdown of the country’s 
health system and infrastructure.
31 “Airstrikes in Iraq,” UN Security Section -  Baghdad, http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/airstrikesl.html. In 
another instance, “Operation Desert Fox” in December 1998 involved large-scale officially acknowledged US and 
UK air strikes against the Iraqi military. From May2002 onwards, the undeclared air war against Iraq was further 
escalated in preparation for the subsequent invasion.
32 Cf. Dodge, Toby, Iraq: Crom War to aNew^duthoritarianism, London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2012, pp. 16-25. The author suggests (p. 25) that “after 2003, Iraq’s position as a failed state might have 
been more destabilizing for the region than the rogue state run by Saddam.” One cannot help but note similarities 
with the more recent Libyan case.
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as the economic foundation of Iraqi statehood is briefly sketched. Second, the future 
geopolitical alignment of Iraq in the regional and global context is discussed. These 
two issues must be consideredjointly since command over the national oil revenue and 
Iraq’s political leadership mutually determine each other. In fact, these two points are 
most crucial in order to judge whether or not the US and UK achieved at least some of 
their intended political objectives. Third, this section considers the emergence of the 
so-called “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) militia since mid-2014 in the context 
of the larger Middle East conflict.
Starting with the oil issue, one should stress that the occupation of Iraq was of 
course not only about oil. One can also disagree about the extent to which US economic 
and political goals were advanced by the militarily imposed political economy of oil in 
Iraq.33 What is beyond doubt, however, is that the actual outcome of the reorganization 
of the country’s oil industry constitutes the most significant single factor as far as the 
future viability of the Iraqi state and its institutions is concerned. Thus, it is an impor­
tant observation in its own right that Iraq’s oil production and exports post-2003 were 
in fact little affected by “failed statehood.” Indeed, with the exception of a small dip 
in 2005, Iraqi oil production nearly doubled between 2004 and 2012 to reach a 30-year 
peak (and second-highest production level ever after 1978).34 Subsequently, this upturn 
has been sustained and the latest available data on oil production from December 2014 
pointed to the “highest amount on record.”35
The protective attitude of the occupying forces toward Iraqi oil sources was already 
noticeable at the moment of the invasion and “of the fifteen hundred oil wells in Iraq’s 
two major oil fields, only nine were damaged during the war.”36 Directly afterwards, 
the US political leadership might have misjudged the strength of its position, since the 
initial plans were little more than the suggestion that the Iraqi oil wealth should be 
directly appropriated by US construction and oil interests. However, this initial plan 
(the Executive Order 13303) of the Bush administration to exercise control over Iraqi 
oil revenue by means of a “Development Fund for Iraq” -  which included earlier Iraqi 
oil revenue that had been put under UN supervision before the invasion under the 
“Oil for Food” programme -  quickly fell apart due to large-scale irregularity in the 
management of the funds. Following the departure of the Paul Bremer-led Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) administration in June 2004 -  after the signing of “Order 
17” which granted immunity to the CPA and the US government from Iraqi law courts
Sy
ria
 a
nd
 Ir
aq
: T
he
 L
on
g-
Te
rm
 C
os
t o
f G
eo
po
lit
ic
al
 D
es
ta
bi
lis
at
io
n
33 Alhajji, Anas F., “The US and the geopolitics of Middle Eastern oil,” in Looney, Robert E. (ed.), Handbook o f 
US-MiddleEastRelations, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009, pp. 121-122, 125.
34 See “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014” for historical tables on Iraqi oil production.
35 Graeber, Daniel J., “Iraqi oil production setting records,” upi.com, February 9, 2015. The author notes that the 
“Islamic State insurgency wasn’t having much of an impact on the overall oil sector in Iraq.”
36 Mayer, Jane, “Contract Sport, What did the Vice-President do for Halliburton?,” Vew 'Yorker, February 16, 
2004.
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for unaccounted funds -  the Iraqi government shifted back, since 2009, to a policy of 
contracting with oil companies from various countries.
From the point of view of interaction between oil production and Iraqi statehood, 
the 2003 occupation cleared some earlier barriers for the expansion of Iraqi oil produc­
tion. In particular, the occupation allowed for new investment in the oil infrastructure 
and for expansion of the capacity of the Basra harbour terminals in the Shatt al-Arab. 
These terminals had been one of the “choke points” for Iraqi oil exports due to the con­
flict with Iran but are now the place from which almost all of Iraq’s oil is shipped.37 The 
largest southern oil fields of Iraq are most relevant for Iraqi government revenue while 
the northern oil fields in the Kurdish autonomous region, estimated at a tenth or so of 
Iraq’s total, suffer from the lack of (reliable) export pipelines and disagreement about 
the distribution of potential revenue between the Baghdad government and the Kurdish 
regional government.38 Another oil region, the area around Kirkuk, is disputed between 
the Kurdish authorities and Baghdad, and contracts between the Kurdish authorities 
and international oil companies have been declared unconstitutional.39
At present, the Iraqi central government continues to control the country’s pipe­
line system and exercises allocation powers over oil contracts outside of the contested 
Kurdish oil fields. Most of the post-2009 contracts have gone to western companies, 
notably BP, Exxon Mobil and Shell, although one observer stressed that “they gave a 
little piece of the cake for China and some other countries and companies to keep them 
silent.”40 In summary, the oil contract game and the question of who has the authority to 
allocate the oil rent will decide the future of Iraqi statehood.
This directly leads to the question of who is going to control future statehood in 
Iraq. The major shift after the occupation was the replacement of the Sunni-dominated 
Saddam regime with a Shia-dominated post-Saddam regime in Baghdad. The Kurdish 
regional authorities were also keen to strengthen their autonomy and bargaining power.
37 “Iraq returns as world’s fastest-growing oil exporter.” reuters.com, March 5, 2014.
38 See International Energy Agency, IraqEnergy Outlook, October 9, 2012, pp. 23, 36, 38, 55. The report asks 
“which entities should have the power to authorize and conclude [oil] contracts” and warns of “consequences that 
arise for Iraq from the absence of a consistent country-wide policy in such a strategic sector” (p. 38). The problem 
of who is entitled to sign contracts results from Article 109 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 stating that the federal 
government “shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields” (emphasis added), 
leaving open the issue ofhow to administer new oil fields.
39 Mills, Robin M., “Northern Iraq’s Oil Chessboard: Energy, Politics and Power.” Insight Turkey, 15, 1, 2013. 
Moreover, Baghdad and the Kurdish authorities disagree about how to contract with foreign oil companies. 
Baghdad favours technical service contracts, limiting the profit share of foreign investors, while the Kurdish 
regional government has signed (contested) production sharing agreements. The latter method favours 
international oil companies and is not frequently used. However, such contracts were in place before the 
nationalization oflraqi oil in 1972.
40 Abdulhay Yahya Zalloum, quoted in Jamail, Dahr, “Western oil firms remain asUS exits Iraq. The end of the 
US military occupation does not mean Iraqis have full control of their oii,”Aljajzeera, January 7, 2012.
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From the US point of view, the major unintended consequence was the strengthening of 
Shia political power, both within Iraq and in the Middle East region, based on a de facto 
alliance between the Baghdad government under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, still in place under Maliki’s successor, the current Iraqi 
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.41 In addition, sectarian conflicts in Iraq since 2003 
triggered the rise of militias, mostly Shia, and the Iraqi army, equipped and trained by 
the US, also became Shia-dominated, not least because the earlier Sunni-dominated 
army had been dissolved.
The US reacted to this rise of Shia power with efforts to “rebalance” in favour of 
Sunnis in Iraq and in the Middle East region. This shift of US strategy included direct 
or indirect -  via Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey -  sponsorship of Sunni militants.42 
Notably, the US military tried to link up with Sunni tribal leaders in Iraq to use them as 
“force multipliers” during the so-called “surge” around 2007 in counter-insurgency ef­
forts -  often against other Sunni insurgents fighting the US occupation. In this context, 
the alienation of Sunnis by the new Shia-dominated Baghdad government was due to 
their large-scale exclusion from political influence for which the US and UK occupi­
ers share responsibility with Iran. Overall, Shia-affiliated political parties and militias 
continue to dominate Iraq’s central government. Only an adequate sharing of power 
between all groups in Iraq can in the long run stabilize the state.
In the meantime, Shia militias with embedded Iranian military advisors have pro­
vided the manpower for the recent advances of the Iraqi government against the ISIS 
militia since March 2015. Most adequately, one might interpret the emergence of ISIS 
as an “evolution” of earlier extremist Sunni militias with Al-Qaida affiliations.43 The 
major analytical question concerns responsibility for the rise of ISIS. In order to answer 
this question, one must first of all stress the permanent mutation of Sunni-extremist 
insurgency groups in Iraq and in the Middle East.
Earlier rounds of the Iraqi conflict during the US-led “surge” in 2007 produced 
an alliance of US troops with Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province and other Sunni 
regions of Iraq. These tribal leaders were in turn well-connected with fellow tribe mem­
bers in Saudi Arabia and Syria. They accepted US military supplies to strengthen their 
hand against Al-Qaida and the Baghdad government. According to one tribal leader, 
the alliance was “a way to get arms, and to be a legalised security force to be able to 
stand against Shia militias and to prevent the Iraqi army and police from entering their
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41 Nasser, Nicola, “Who Has More Influence? Rapprochement with US Reinforces Iran Hand in Iraq.” Sri Lanka 
Guardian, October 3, 2013.
42 Hersh, Seymour H., “The Redirection. Is the Administration’s new policy benefitting our enemies in the war on 
terrorism?,” New 'Yorker, March 5, 2007.
43 Hashim, Ahmed S., “From Al-Qaida Affiliate to the Rise of the Islamic Caliphate: The Evolution of the 
Islamic State oflraq and Syria (ISIS),” PolicyReport, S. Rajaratnam School oflntemational Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University, December 2014, p .l l .
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[Sunni tribal] area.” The same informant compared the US position with “someone who 
brought cats to fight rats, found himself with too many cats and brought dogs to fight 
the cats. Now they need elephants.”44
It is clear that the “success” of the US-led “surge” against Al-Qaida in Iraq in 2007 
produced new security risks. The same apply to subsequent efforts by the US to train 
Sunnis in the context of the US-supplied Iraqi army. After the ISIS uprising in Iraq in 
June 2014, the weapons of Sunni units of the Iraqi army were largely abandoned and 
taken over by ISIS militants. In neighbouring Syria, ISIS also gained weapons from 
many other sources, such as anti-tank rockets that had earlier been transferred by Saudi 
Arabia to forces operating under the “Free Syrian Army” umbrella.45
In terms of overall responsibility for the rise of Sunni Islamist extremists, US 
Vice-President Joseph Biden said in an unscripted question-and-answer session with 
students at Harvard University on 2 October 2014, “our allies in the region were our 
largest problem.” He argued that Turkey, the Saudis and the Emirates “were so deter­
mined to take down Assad and essentially have a proxy Sunni-Shia war.... They poured 
hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of tons of weapons into anyone 
who would fight against Assad -  except that the people who were being supplied were 
Al-Nusra and Al-Qaida and the extremist elements ofjihadists coming from other parts 
of the world.”46
He added, “[T]his outfit called ISIL [i.e., another abbreviation for ISIS], which was 
Al-Qaida in Iraq ... worked with Al-Nusra, who we declared a terrorist group early 
on, and we could not convince our colleagues to stop supplying them. Now all of a 
sudden.. .the President [Obama] has been able to put together a coalition of our Sunni
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44 Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, “Meet Abu Abed: the US’s new ally against al-Qaida.” Guardian, November 10, 2007. 
Indeed, more recent press coverage underlines that US analysts, in efforts to “defeat the Islamic State by fostering 
Sunni resistance.” demand “greater autonomy for Sunni provinces, like that granted to the Iraqi Kurds” to 
“persuade Sunnis to rebel againstthe Islamic State.” See Pape, Robert A., “Getting ISIS out oflraq,” International 
New 'fork "Times, April 21, 2015. The ideathat further division oflraq will help to defeat ISIS deserves to be 
compared with the "elephants” quoted in the 2007 article.
45 Conflict Armament Research, “Islamic State Weapons in Iraq and Syria. Analysis of weapons and ammunition 
captured from Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria.” September 2014, http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/09/Dispatch_IS_Iraq_Syria_Weapons.pdf, p. 6.
46 For Biden’s extraordinary Harvard statements, seein particular the section 53:24to 59:12 minutes, https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dcKVCtg5dxM. Referring to arms deliveries from US regional allies to the Islamist 
extremists, Biden asked the rhetorical question, “Where did all of this go?” He forgotto askthe necessary follow­
up question, “Where did all of this come from?”
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neighbours because Americans can’t once again went [Vc] to a Muslim nation and be 
the aggressor, it has to be led by Sunnis to go and attack a Sunni organization.”47
Thus, the question of responsibility for the rise of ISIS requires acknowledging that 
the group’s emergence is due to earlier rounds of failed intervention in Iraq. In addition, 
ISIS, the Nusra Front and other Sunni insurgency groups all have common roots in 
the regional Sunni regimes. In order to defeat ISIS and the other groups, the closure of 
borders to Turkey and Saudi Arabia would be most significant in cutting off the eco­
nomic and logistical supply routes. Last but not least, one must highlight the fact that 
the large majority of Sunnis do not support ISIS ideology. In fact, most of the victims 
of ISIS violence are also Sunnis. In the medium term, the geopolitical significance of 
ISIS could be in assisting outside powers in efforts to divide Iraq and Syria into smaller 
“statelets.” However, one should acknowledge that this is at present still geopolitical 
speculation. For the moment, ISIS has been kept safely away from the strategically 
significant oil fields in the region -  other than the Syrian ones.
5 . T h e  C r i s i s  C y c l e  i n  S y r i a  s i n c e  2011
Finally, one needs to explain how the Syrian conflict since 2011 relates to the situa­
tion in Iraq. This section will first briefly highlight some features of the Syrian crisis 
and will then outline the major regional and global geopolitical factors that explain 
the step-by-step escalation until now. The most important observation is that “media 
bias in reporting remains a key challenge, plaguing the collection of useful data and 
misinforming researchers and policymakers regarding the actual events taking place.”48 
There has been no conflict since the end of the Cold War that has been subject to such 
extreme media bias and misrepresentation. One must stress that practically all claims 
about the current conflict have been issued with an attached political agenda. The 
western media have been overwhelmingly fed by the “Syrian Observatory for Human 
Rights,” a Coventry (UK)-based virtual organization represented by a single person
47 In the same context, Biden stressed that there was no group in Syria that they “could identify as moderate”, 
adding, “by the way, I am serious about that” (ibid.). His statement of the fact that Turkey allowed Sunni 
insurgents to pass from its territory into Syria triggered a demand by Turkish President Erdogan for him to issue an 
apology, which was duly offered. In turn, aATw 'fork "Times journalist suggested that Biden “apologized fortelling 
the truth.” http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/joe-biden-apologizes-for-telling-the-truth/?_r=0.
48 Baliki, Ghassan, “1. Aspects of the Conflict in Syria.” SIPRI 'Yearbook 2014, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
p. 17.
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who is a long-term opponent of the Syrian regime. A large share of “facts” on the 
Syrian conflict issued in the western media is derived from this single source.49
This is no space to highlight more than a few exemplary contested issues. To begin 
with, the conflict in Syria has from the start in March 2011 been fuelled by arms, fund­
ing and logistical assistance from neighbouring countries, with Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
focusing on the former and Turkey focusing on the latter. The conflict quickly turned 
into a transnational war in Syria due to the presence of foreign fighters, initially only 
on the side of the insurgents, and the direct logistical support of invasions into Syria by 
insurgents from neighbouring countries. After regime change in Libya in 2012, large­
scale delivery of weapons from Libyan arms depots to the insurgents -  a development 
that required the extensive involvement of western intelligence agencies -  triggered 
further escalation. In turn, the Syrian government could rely on its existing alliances 
with Hizbollah, Iran and Russia for support, while the insurgents received their sup­
plies from Sunni states and western sources. Since then, “rebalancing” has kept the 
conflict going and escalating.50
Three points might serve as examples of western media bias in the coverage of the 
Syrian conflict. First, the western media have continuously downplayed the level of 
support that the Syrian government enjoyed and continues to enjoy. In 2011 and 2012, 
when political rallies were still possible, the largest mobilizations in the history of the 
country took place and hundreds of thousands of citizens expressed their support for 
the government in all major Syrian cities on numerous occasions. These rallies were 
underreported in the western media or were explained away as forced mobilizations 
of Syrian civil servants while much smaller opposition rallies were at the same time 
claimed to amount to a “revolution.” In 2014, Syrian presidential elections took place 
under conditions of war. Bashar al-Assad faced for the first time in Syria’s history two 
moderate opposition candidates, and the most significant message of this election was 
the high level of citizens’ participation in areas under government control. This was 
particularly striking when compared with the presidential elections in Egypt under the 
military regime around the same time in which participation rates were very low. Thus, 
the coalition that backs up the current Syrian state and that enjoys high degrees of 
support from all minorities and from Sunnis has so far survived attack from Islamist 
extremists, who make up the large majority of the foreign-backed insurgency.
49 Even sustained Internet research does not allow the identification of reliable information about “Rami Abdul 
Rahman”, who speaks for the “Observatory”, which is in turn only represented by the spokesman. Stories in 
established news outlets such as BBC, Reuters and New 'fork "Times draw the picture of a long-term opposition 
activist who uses the phone to gather information on Syrian events. Never in history has a single citizen-journalist 
had such an impact on the international media!
50 Dostal, Jörg Michael, “Analyzing the domestic and international conflict in Syria: Are there lessons from 
political science?,” SyrianStudies, 6, 1, 2014, http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/822.
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Most Syrians would of course like to see the conflict end as soon as possible and 
would consider political compromises to achieve this goal. However, the coalition back­
ing the current government cannot realistically engage in negotiations with the “big 
three” armed extremist groups, i.e., the Islamic State (ISIS), the Nusra Front (the af­
filiate of Al-Qaida operating in Syria) and Islamic Front.51 In this situation, the Syrian 
minorities, notably Christians, must hope that the Syrian government will continue to 
be able to protect them.
Second, most of the western media treats as fact the assertion that the Syrian mili­
tary has used chemical weapons in the ongoing conflict. However, such assertions have 
not been proven. There is no conclusive evidence that the Syrian government has ever 
used chemical weapons. There are, on the other hand, allegations that appear to show 
that insurgents, particularly the Nusra Front, received and/or produced locally chemi­
cal weapons on a small scale and used such weapons on more than one occasion in 
the hope of triggering a Libyan-style military intervention by the US and other NATO 
countries in Syria that would break the Assad regime.52 Once again, there is no conclu­
sive evidence, although the cui bono question might suggest this to be much more likely 
than the former claim. For the time being, one needs to simply stress that conclusive 
evidence for any of the assertions is not available.
Third, there is underreporting of how extremist insurgents, such as the Nusra 
Front, enjoy direct logistical support from the Turkish government. In the case of the 
joint attack of Nusra and Islamic Front on the Syrian-Armenian city of Kessab, located 
close to the Turkish border, on March 21, 2014, the Turkish border post was opened for 
the insurgents to enter Syria, which allowed for a surprise attack on a town that consists 
largely of descendants of survivors of the Armenian Genocide of 1915.53 The example 
of the Kessab attack (and it is only one example among many) underlines the fact that 
the extremist insurgency groups are directly cooperating with the intelligence agencies
51 Foran analysis of the current Syrian situation, see the untitled paper by Arslanian, Ferdinand, February 19, 
2015, http://media.wix.com/ugd/fbl673_b36489fb04a94ddl91elf0499clffe82.pdf.
52 See Hersh, Seymour H., “Whose sarin?.” LondonReview ofBooks, December 19, 2013, and “The Red Line 
and the Rat Line/’LowdowRevz'ew ofBooks, April 17, 2014. In addition, one must highlight the fact that the 
Nusra Front captured the only chlorine gas manufacturing plant in Syria. According to the owner of the plant, 
Mohammad Sabbagh, “[n]o one can know for certain, but if it turns out chlorine gas was used in the [March 19, 
2013 Khan al-Asad] attack, then the first possibility is that it was mine. There is no other factory in Syria that can 
make this gas, and now it is under opposition control.” See Baker, Aryn, “Syria’s Civil War: The Mystery Behind 
a Deadly Chemical Attack.” "Time, April 1, 2013. Claims aboutthe use of chlorine gas in fighting in Syria continue 
to circulate in the media in 2015.
53 Ghazanchyan, Siranush, “The Telegraph reveals Turkish role in the attack on Armenian-populated Kessab.” 
April 15, 2014, Public Radio of Armenia, armradio.am. Some Internet videos, issued directly afterthe attack and 
likely to be authentic, as they were carried by pro-Syrian government and insurgency websites alike, show the 
insurgents walking freely from the Turkish to the Syrian border post carrying black flags and other insignia. On 
June 15, 2014, the Syrian Army retook Kessab and the local population subsequently returned.
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of Turkey and other states in the region that aim to remove the Syrian government at all 
costs.
How can one make sense of the all-out effort to remove Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad and how does this campaign relate to the events in Iraq? Once again, it needs 
to be stressed that the US has been committed to regime change in Damascus for a 
long time. This was official policy during the presidency ofBush Jr., when efforts were 
made to isolate Syria in the region, although this policy did not proceed in any linear 
fashion. Following the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri, Syria was blamed by US observers -  the case remains unsolved -  and efforts 
were made to further put pressure on Syria. At other times, the Syrian regime was in­
vited to participate in regional diplomacy with western countries, such as during failed 
negotiations about a “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement” with the European 
Union.54 However, one must stress that leading US politicians were always keen to 
“turn” Syria by replacing its current leadership.55
Once again, why Syria? The country currently has limited oil and gas resources 
and its share of Middle Eastern overall military spending is only around 1 per cent. It 
cannot be said to constitute any present direct threat to neighbouring countries -  other 
than as a failed state. Without denying the role of Syrian internal conflicts as one of the 
drivers of events since the start of the crisis in March 2011, one must stress that Syrian 
domestic politics cannot be explained without focusing on the outside alliances of the 
domestic actors.
Most importantly, Syria and Iran were during the entire post-colonial period in a 
conflictual relationship with Iraq. Never before the US occupation of Iraq were the gov­
ernments in Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran aligned with each other. Since 1980, Syria 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran had a mutual defence treaty against Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq, which only highlighted the long-term conflict between Damascus and Baghdad 
going back to the 1960s. The removal of Saddam, therefore, allowed for the first time in 
history for the emergence of an alliance between the three governments.
From the US perspective, the consolidation of this triple alliance -  recently con­
firmed in a trilateral meeting of the deputy foreign ministers of Syria, Iraq and Iran in 
Tehran on April 22, 2015 -  would clearly be the worst-case scenario due to at least five 
factors. First, a three-country alliance would continue to support Shia political move­
ments in Lebanon, such as Hizbollah, and would strengthen the “Axis of Resistance”
54 Dostal, Jörg Michael and Zorob, Anja, Syria and iheKuro-^ednerraneanRelanonship. Bolder, Col.: Lynne 
Rienner, 2008.
55 In this context, the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution might be singled out as a crucial long-term 
pressure group in favour of regime change in Syria, cf. Byman, Daniel et al., “Saving Syria: Assessing Options for 
Regime Change/’M/ddZeEortMewo 27, March 15, 2012.
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currently consisting of Hizbollah in Lebanon, Syria and Iran by adding Iraq. Second, 
survival of the current Syrian government would reconfirm the country’s long-standing 
alliance with Russia, the successor state of the Soviet Union, dating back to 1956. 
Third, the territory of the three states could act as a barrier against oil pipeline projects 
linking Saudi and Qatari oil and gas sources with Turkey and western markets. Fourth, 
an alliance between the three states would conversely allow for alternative pipeline 
projects -  out of reach of western or Gulf Arab control -  linking Syrian, Iraqi and 
Iranian oil and gas with the Mediterranean or the Chinese market. Fifth, largely unex­
plored but apparently significant natural gas deposits on the Syrian coast line (and in its 
proximity) could be linked with emerging markets in Asia and would provide resources 
for the future economic rehabilitation of Syria. As discussed above, the geopolitical 
influence of pipeline projects on Syrian domestic politics goes back as far as the 1949 
Syrian coups and has been a permanent feature of Syrian and Middle Eastern politics 
ever since.
In summary, the issue of who exercises effective geopolitical control of the Middle 
East once again points back to the Eisenhower Doctrine of gaining and defending US 
hegemony in the Middle East region.
C o n c l u s i o n
In a speech delivered in 2007, retired US general Wesley Clark recalled a personal 
conversation with Paul Wolfowitz, then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which is 
alleged to have taken place at the Pentagon in 1991. Clark holds that Wolfowitz, when 
asked about his views on the “Desert Storm” military campaign that had just forced 
Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, replied as follows: “[O]ne thing we did learn (...) we learned 
that we could use our military in the region, in the Middle East, and the Soviets won’t 
stop us. And we’ve got about five to ten years to clean up those old Soviet client re­
gimes, Syria, Iran, Iraq, before the next great superpower comes on to challenge us.”56 
The point in quoting this conversation is not to claim that it took place as reported.57 
Rather, it clearly could have taken place, and these words perfectly fit the Eisenhower 
Doctrine and, since the 1990s, many similar statements were issued by mainstream US 
policy-makers with regard to Middle East affairs.
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56 See Wesley Clark’s 2007speechat the Commonwealth Club of California (full reference in footnote 3 above), 
at4:17 min., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TY2DKzastu8.
57 Indeed, the Islamic Republic of Iran has never beena “Soviet client” during the period that came to adose in 
1991.
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The thesis advanced in this paper is that the Eisenhower Doctrine of unilateral 
US control of the Middle East was conceived under another horizon, in 1957, and is 
both old-fashioned and utopian. Efforts at unilateral control on the part of the US -  
with the UK occasionally acting as a sidekick -  are unlikely to succeed for at least 
two reasons. First, the Middle East has been, and continues to be, a deeply divided 
geopolitical theatre. The issue of Palestinian rights and of occupied Syrian lands (the 
Golan Heights) will not go away even if the US were to “clean up” the regimes that are 
currently resisting them. There has been virtually no movement on these two issues for 
many decades. There will always be a powerful line of thought in the Arab world that 
will react to what is seen as the unprincipled backing, on the part of the US, of policies 
that are unacceptable to most Arabs. Second, the issue of the emergence of a multi­
polar world order in the 21st century is not going to go away. Indeed, one might ask 
whether US strategy in the region is speeding up rather than slowing down the growth 
in significance of competing powers. There are many interests at stake in the Middle 
East in the 21st century -  and hardly any of them can be addressed in the context of US 
unilateralism.
As far as the Arab regional level is concerned, one might stress that the price 
for the policy of “rebalancing” is a never-ending chain of proxy conflicts in which 
“Sunni states” and “Shia states” are going to waste their potential and resources while 
strengthening the position of those who want to impose on them from outside. Besides, 
these concepts are equally dangerous since the underlying conflicts are much more 
geopolitical than sectarian. They certainly ignore the fact that Sunnis, Shias and many 
other groups have lived in harmony in most Arab societies most of the time. Today, it 
might sound naive to ask why there is no Arab superpower in the 21st century. Until the 
1980s, Arab public opinion expected a much larger role for Arab voices in international 
affairs. This never materialised, however. In addition, it is important to recall that divi­
sions amongst the Arabs have in the past in the overwhelming number of cases been 
settled by restoring the status quo. Indeed, one might interpret the failure of the so- 
called “Arab Spring,” as underlined in the maintenance or restoration of authoritarian 
regimes almost everywhere in the region, as another example of the existence of some 
underlying balance of forces that tends to be reinforcing.
Finally, when looking at Syria and Iraq, the crisis in the two countries is currently 
often cited as evidence for an alleged end of the “Sykes-Picot system” of 1916 and the 
breakdown of “artificial” border lines. This reasoning is, however, unlikely to carry 
the day. In fact, all border lines in the Middle East are artificial in many respects. 
Destroying Syria or Iraq as unified states is certainly not a recipe for future regional 
stability and would only produce new rounds of conflict. The US calculation that re­
moval of the Syrian regime, in line with the Iraqi example, would constitute a way to 
win -  in addition to sending messages to Russia and other powers -  appears too risky to 
be sustainable. It also encourages the regional allies of the US, Saudi Arabia comes to 
mind, to engage in provocations that further escalate the situation.
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In the end, the reasonable argument in favour of a multipolar world order is that 
it would potentially allow searching for agreements at the international, regional and 
local level to end the proxy wars and to deal with the underlying conflicts in ways that 
are less destructive than has so far been the case in the 21st century.
Jörg Michael Dostal, D.Phil (Oxon), is Associate Professor at the Graduate School of 
Public Administration, Seoul National University, Korea. In addition, he is a Senior Fellow of 
the Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St. Andrews, UK.
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